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US-European  financial  and  monetary relations  in recent years 
have  not  been  free  from irritation and  recrimination.  These 
have  gone  beyond  the sphere of monetary  experts.  US  financial 
policies have  been criticized by prime ministers,  by 
presidents,  even  by  a  king.  Not  long  ago  the king of this 
country expressed his  disapproval,  perhaps  the first time 
since  George  III that Americans  earned  themselves  a  royal 
reprimand.  Listening to the  reproaches  to and  fro  I  sometimes 
feel  like that  judge who,  after having heard the plaintiff, 
concluded he was  right and  then,  after listening to the 
defendant,  agreed with him;  when  someone  in court protested 
that the  judge  could  not  agree with both,  the latter pondered 
this over  and  then said:  why,  you're right too! 
I  share  the European worry that the  US  tends  to be  inward-
looking in financial  and monetary matters,  ignoring the 
international repercussions  of its internal policies.  At  the 
same  time  I  believe there is much  truth  in the American 
rejoinder that many  of the problems  Europe  blames  on  the  US 
are of its own  making.  Perhaps  the  most  suqcinct way  to 
summarize  the  view  I  am  going to set out  today is that on 
neither side of the Atlantic are policies sufficiently 
consistent to make  international monetary  cooperation 
effective.  The  lack of international monetary  cooperation 
cannot fail to have  negative effects outside the monetary 
sphere. 
The  international monetary role of the  US  is characterized at 
present by  its twin deficits:  an  unsustainably  large public 
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sector deficit and  an  equally unsustainable current account 
deficit.  These deficits are reflected in high  interest rates 
and  unpredictable,  strongly fluctuating  exchange  rates.  Both 
are  bad  for  the world  economy. 
Among  the  adverse  effects of high  interest rates  is the 
burden of the highly  indebted countries.  For  the developing 
countries  as  a  group,  1%  decrease of the relevant interest 
rates would  mean  a  direct reduction of the burden of annual 
interest payments  in the order of  $  2  billion. 
The  effects of the  strong fluctuations  in dollar rates are 
less  easy to quantify.  But  the uncertainty they  engender  can 
hardly fail to have  an  unfavourable effect on  international 
investment decisions  and  they probably cause additional 
strains  in the  European Monetary  System. 
The  reasons  for  the American  tendency to ignore the external 
repercussions  of their policies are  in part the size and 
11closedness
11  of the  US  economy.  To  this were  added what  could 
be  called 
11ideological
11  factors. 
The  size of the  US  economy  and  the  modest part of inter-
national trade  in proportion to national  income  - some  10%  -
has  for  many  years  determined the  US  attitude  in inter-
national  financial  and  monetary affairs.  Other  countries,  in 
taking  into account  external  repercussions,  do  so not 
primarily for  idealistic reasons  but because they are  aware 
of their dependence  on  the  rest of the world.  In  the  case of 
the  US,  both  dependence  and  awareness  of it are less.  There 
is  a  feeling  that to take it into account would  mean  the tail 
wagging  the  dog. 
The  ideological  factor,  though  not  new  - the expression 
11benign neglect
11  dates  from  the early seventies  - has 
probably been  strengthened by monetarist theories.  These 
discourage  authorities  from having external policy objectives 
concerning the  exchange  rate or the  structure of the balance 
of payments.  In this view,  if only the authorities pursue - 3  -
correct domestic  monetary policies,  international stability 
will automatically result. 
They  should not try to aim at  a  specific exchange  rate or 
balance of payments  structure since this would  be  an  obstacle 
in attaining the  domestic  monetary objectives,  while  the 
authorities are  not  in  a  position to know better than the 
market  the correct exchange  rate or balance of payments 
structure  anyway.  Whether  a  country is  a  net  lender or  a  net 
borrower  should  in this  view  be  determined  by  the market.  In 
my  view proper monetary policies are certainly necessary.  But 
I  cannot agree that when  such policies are  in place the 
exchange  rate and  balance of payments  structure can  be  left 
entirely to the market.  There has  to be  an  international 
consensus  on  the desirable balance of payments  structure.  The 
basis of that consensus  should  be  that the  industrial world 
has  to be  a  net  lender,  not  a  net borrower.  In the short  run 
this  does  not  apply to individual countries  - given  for 
instance the differences  in cyclical situation between  them  -
but  in the  longer  run it should.  Domestic policies which 
influence  the balance of payments  anyway,  be it often  in  a 
way which was  not  intended,  should be  consistent with  the 
desirable balance of payments  structure.  This  implies  that an 
industrial  country  should avoid  a  structural budget deficit 
exceeding  domestic  savings  that are available to the public 
sector without  crowding out the private sector.  The  desirable 
balance of payments  structure also provides  a  basis  for 
judging the  exchange  rate.  It may  not  be  a  basis  for  fine 
tuning,  but that should  not  justify acquiescence  in the huge 
exchange  rate fluctuations  of recent years.  This  to  some 
extent is the  view that prevails  in the  EMS.  The  US 
authorities reject it and  are  not prepared to discuss policy 
coordination in these terms. 
The  resulting imbalances  bother  them less than they  do  other 
countries.  This  is not  only because  the  size of the  domestic 
economy  makes  it less sensitive but also because it led to 
the  emergence  of the dollar as  an  international  currency. - 4  -
This  enables  the  US  to pay other countries with dollars or, 
which  is the  same  thing,  not to pay but to borrow.  Thus, 
while Europe  has  to pay the price  in the  end  when  it loses 
control of its public finances,  when  the  US  budget gets out 
of control it is not  the  US  but others who  foot  the bill, 
among  them once  again Europe.  Europeans  watch  this with  a 
mixture of feelings,  in which  righteous  indignation is 
paramount  and  envy not entirely absent. 
Monetary  relations with the  US  are  further  complicated  by  a 
number  of factors.  One  is  a  divergence of  views  within the 
administration.  There  is  a  general desire to reduce  the 
budget deficit,  though  no  agreement  on  how  to do it.  However, 
while  some  of its spokesmen  acknowledge  the harmful  effects 
of the huge  budget deficit,  which  is  a  necessary step towards 
remedying it,  others  tend to deny  or belittle these effects, 
notably those  on  interest rates  and  the balance of payments. 
There  are also differences  in the  degree  of willingness  to 
take the  exterior into account.  The  Federal  Reserve  System 
- at least in Washington  and  New  York  - would  probably be 
more  ready  to cooperate with other countries  in for  instance 
intervention operations  than  in fact proved possible  in 
recent years.  This  might have  contributed to prevent the 
overshooting of the dollar rate which  was  so obvious  to 
Europeans  towards  the  end of last year.  The  Fed  - as  can  be 
seen  from  the published  records  of the Federal Open  Market 
Committee  - is also aware  of the effects of high  interest 
rates  on  debtor  countries  and,  as  a  consequence,  on  US  banks. 
And  they are  aware  of the  fact that  a  steep decrease of the 
dollar tends  to  increase  inflation,  an  effect denied  by 
orthodox monetarists  (who  regard the  money  supply as  the sole 
cause  of  inflation).  A  serious  complication is added  by  the 
attitude of the Congress,  recently illustrated by  the  agony 
which preceded  the final  approval  of the  increase of  IMF 
quota's.  The  long list of amendments  introduced on  that 
occasion were hardly proof of understanding,  and  care  for 
that matter,  of the  requirements  of international monetary - 5  -
cooperation.  This  attitude understandably makes  the  admini-
stration extremely reluctant to enter into any  engagement 
that might  involve the Congress. 
Having  said all this,  let me  try to balance  my  criticism to 
some  extent.  If the  US  has  been  reluctant to accept external 
constraints with  regard to domestic policies,  one  cannot  say 
that the  rest of the world were  more  willing to do  so if they 
could help it.  Not  being reserve centers,  most  countries 
could  not  escape  constraints  in the way  the  US  could.  But 
they could  borrow  in other forms.  There  seldom was  any 
reluctance to agree to more  international credit on  easier 
terms,  it never was  difficult to find  a  majority outside the 
US  that favoured  money  creation in whatever  form  irrespective 
of the  need  to hold  reserves.  In the  IMF  it was  the  US  which 
under  the  successive administrations  checked  the permanent 
international pressure  for  reserve creation.  Possibly the 
successive American  administrations were  strengthened  in 
their opposition by  the knowledge  that if they agreed 
Congress  would  object  on  domestic  considerations.  Even  so  I 
believe that  in doing  so the  US  performed  a  useful  function, 
though  not necessarily always  for  the right reasons. 
Connected  with this was  its opposition to constant pressure 
to turn the  IMF  into a  kind of United Nations  or,  failing 
that,  to transfer decisions  on  money  creation to the  United 
Nations.  Treasuries  and  central banks  of most  industrial 
countries  opposed this,  and  for  good  reasons.  But  I  am  not 
sure how  firm  some  of them would have been  in the  absence  of 
the  consistency in the American  view  in this matter. 
And  most  important of all,  of course,  economic  recovery  in 
the  US  played  a  crucial role  in helping the rest of the world 
to start coming  out of the  recession. 
Therefore criticism of the  US,  though  justified in several 
respects,  should not  ignore  those  elements  that were  benefi-
cial.  Nor  should  those  Europeans  who  justly reproach  the  US - 6  -
for its reluctance to coordinate policies  forget that the 
negative effects of that reluctance would harm  us  less if 
only we  ourselves would  be prepared  for  more  coordination 
amongst  ourselves. 
An  obvious  European  reaction to mitigate the negative effects 
of  US  policies would  be  intensified efforts  for  European 
cooperation.  This  was  the  case five years  ago,  when  an 
uncontroled  slide of the dollar was  among  the  main  reasons 
for  the  foundation of the  European  Monetary  System.  More 
recently it could also have mitigated the effects of high  US 
interest rates. 
If the  EMS  countries would  form  a  solid bloc with  sustainable 
and  therefore  credible  exchange  rate relations  between  them, 
they would  be  less affected by  large exchange  rate movements 
vis-a-vis  the dollar than they are  now.  That would  enable 
them to  some  extent to insulate their interest rate policies 
from  US  interest rates.  If one  takes  the  EC  as  a  whole,  trade 
with third countries  amounts  to merely  12%  of aggregate  GNP, 
making  it comparable  to the  United States  in this respect. 
Unfortunately,  exchange  rate relations within the  EMS  in the 
past have  seldom  remained  credible  for  long. 
One  reason was  diverging policies and  diverging  fundamentals. 
This  sooner or later - and  in fact  increasingly sooner  - led 
to realignment  expectations  and  speculation. 
Secondly,  defense against speculation was  often less  than 
effective.  There  used  to be  an  understandable reluctance 
against raising interest rates to defend  ones  currency.  But 
the  only alternative is to accommodate  speculation,  thus 
perpetuating it. ---~----.  ---· 
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Thus,  realignment  expectations  in the past often proved 
self-fulfilling,  and  speculation rewarding.  For  when  realign-
ments  were  forced  upon  the  authorities,  they often wanted  to 
make  them  large  enough  to be  credible to the market.  The 
disappointing  inflation performance  in some  EC  countries  is 
being blamed  on  the high dollar,  but  could equally be 
attributed to the  excessive  realignment of  a  year  ago. 
Moreover,  political rather than  economic  considerations 
played  an  increasing role.  They  were  the main  reason that 
changes  of exchange  rates  took  the  form of a  general  upheaval 
intended to take the  limelight off specific devaluations 
which were  considered to be politically embarrassing. 
All this hardly contributed to interest rate  autonomy  of the 
EMS  as  a  bloc.  Rather it contributed to uncertainty.  And  that 
may  well  be  reflected in an  uncertainty premium keeping 
interest rates higher than  need  be. 
A  policy aimed at interest rate autonomy has  apparent 
contradictions which  can  make  acceptance difficult.  It can 
only be  achieved at the  cost of strict domestic policies, 
whereas  many  want it in order to be  free  in their domestic 
policies.  It can  imply raising interest rates  in the 
short-run,  whereas  it is wanted  in order to be  able to lower 
them.  Given  these  limitations it is not  surprising that  some 
are  looking for easier ways  to achieve  autonomy:  for  autonomy 
without  tears.  There has  always  been  a  tendency  in the  EC  to 
concentrate on  technical  gimmicks  as  an  escape  from policy 
constraints.  Couldn't we  obtain autonomy  against the dollar 
by  creating a  dollar of our  own,  the Ecu?  We  could:  the only 
thing we  need  is having it replace our present national 
currencies  and  creating common  European markets  comparable  to 
the American  ones.  Unfortunately that means  a  phase  in 
integration not quite yet  achieved.  Then  couldn't we  achieve 
autonomy  by  surrounding ourselves with  a  wall  of  exchange 
restrictions? Given  the objective,  that would  imply  uniform 
exchange  restrictions against third countries  applied  in 
Europe  by  both deficit and  surplus  countries,  which it is not - 8  -
so  easy to  imagine.  Here  too  lack of homogeneity  seems  to 
render  uniformity  impractical.  Quite apart  from  the  fact that 
exchange  restrictions have  seldom proved effective,  and 
seldom result in  low  interest rates.  Thus,  autonomy  vis-a-vis 
US  interest rates  does  not  mean  that we  can act as  we  like. 
It does  not  free  us  from  the need  for  monetary discipline. 
But  the dollar constraint,  which  can  be  irrational if US 
policies  ignore external  repercussions,  could to some  extent 
be  replaced  by  EMS  discipline,  which  can be beneficial as 
long as  it reflects the purpose of the  EMS:  to establish  a 
zone  of monetary stability in Europe. 
In 1975  the  US  and  France,  after much  bickering about whether 
or  not  a  system of stable exchange  rates was  an  acceptable 
objective,  finally  agreed  on  a  formula  subsequently enshrined 
in the Articles of Agreement  of the  IMF:  not  on  a  system of 
stable exchange  rates,  but  on  "a  stable system of exchange 
rates".  Each  side  could  give its own  interpretation.  It is 
obvious  now  that the result was  not  stable exchange  rates. 
Neither was  it a  stable system.  The  question  is whether it 
was  a  system at all.  One  might  call it an  unstable  non-
system.  It did not prevent the authorities  from  coping with 
emergencies  since all participants realized that this was  in 
their own  good  interest.  I  am  fairly confident that they will 
cope with  emergencies  in the future  as well.  But  one  should 
hope  for  more.  For the  emergence  of  a  system which  to  some 
extent will prevent  emergencies  from arising.  In  my  view  a 
system by  definition  implies  the acceptance of international 
commitments  and  constraints.  On  paper,  all members  of the  IMF 
have  accepted  the obligation to promote  stability and 
entrusted to the  IMF  the task of surveillance of their 
exchange  rate policies.  However,  this  is  a  far  cry  from 
accepting external constraints  in practice.  That  is what  I 
meant  when  questioning in how  far  we  have  a  system.  But  I 
could happily  go  along with  secretary Regan's  formulation 
that the  real  challenge  is to develop  the  system we  already 
have  and  to strengthen the Fund's  surveillance activities. - 9  -
The  real  issue is,  of course,  not  one  of words.  It is how  to 
reconcile  internal and  external objectives,  what  external 
constraint - or discipline  - to accept  in domestic policies. 
In this respect the  EMS  countries  recognize  - at least in 
principle  - that  international monetary  cooperation  implies 
that internal and  external objectives will have  to be 
reconciled.  They  are  not  always  successful  in that reconcili-
ation,  i.e.  in agreeing what  measure  of external discipline 
is necessary.  As  long as  they disagree about that among 
themselves prospects  for better transatlantic cooperation are 
limited.  You  cannot  obtain it by  blaming  one  another  for its 
absence.  Neither by  instituting "target zones"  between  the 
Ecu  and  the dollar.  In the present situation those would  be 
meaningless.  The  Ecu  would  stand for  a  number  of European 
currencies with widely different balance of payments  posi-
tions.  The  US  would  not  submit to external constraints 
whether  the dollar was  within the target zone  or outside it. 
As  long  as  that is the case,  the  institution of target zones 
would  con·sti  tute the  same  kind of gimmickry  some  want  to 
introduce  in the  EMS. 
Global stability should start within Europe.  If Europe  would 
succeed  in moving  towards  a  more  solid bloc with credible and 
sustainable  exchange  rates,  this might have  two  advantages  in 
the monetary  sphere.  On  the one  hand it would,  as  I  said, 
become  less  vulnerable to the effects of dollar fluctuations. 
On  the other,  perhaps  somewhat  paradoxically,  it might  be  in 
a  position to attain a  better cooperation with  the  US  and 
thus  reduce  dollar fluctuations.  Thus,  effective European 
cooperation could  be  a  first step towards  increased global 
monetary  stability. 
That would  also  improve  the political atmosphere,  even at the 
summit.  Criticism of  US  monetary  and  financial policies  by 
Giscard  and  Schmidt  could to  some  extent be  shrugged off as 
personal hobbies,  left over  from  the  time  they were ministers 
of finance.  In the case of Mitterand and  Kohl  that is no 
longer possible.  Thus,  a  renewed  effort to bring about  a 
stable system,  while  implying  the acceptance  of constraints, 
would  bring benefits  far  exceeding the  monetary  sphere. 